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We assume the existence of institutions that can provide incentives 
on a limited budget. The policy switches the incentive from 
rewarding to punishing when the frequency of cooperators exceeds 
a threshold. The amount of rewards (or penalties) per target is equal 
to the incentive budget divided by the number of cooperators (or 
defectors). We find that this policy establishes and maintains full 
cooperation at lower cost and under a wider range of conditions 
than either rewarding or punishing alone, in infinitely large, well-
mixed populations, as well as in spatially structured populations. 
 
Adaptive hybridization of carrots and sticks 
Social institutions often use rewards (‘carrots’) and penalties (‘sticks’) to promote cooperation. Providing incentives tends to be costly, so it is 
important to find efficient strategies for the combined use and synthesis of rewards and penalties. Most studies of cooperation have, 
however, addressed rewarding and punishing in isolation and have focused on peer-to-peer sanctioning as opposed to institutional 
sanctioning. Here, we demonstrate that an institutional sanctioning policy we call ‘first carrot, then stick’ is unexpectedly successful in 
promoting cooperation in the standard public good game. Our results show that this hybrid policy of rewards and penalties is a surprisingly 
inexpensive and widely applicable method, compared to either rewards or penalties alone.   
Carrots or sticks? 
Individuals play the game with the nearest four neighbors on the 
100 × 100 square lattice, in which a single cooperator is initially 
given among a defector population. Specifically, the domain of 
applicability of the adaptive hybrid policy is the widest among the 
three incentive strategies (a–c). Once full cooperation has been 
established, the adaptive hybrid policy and pure punishing are 
equally successful in preventing the emergence of defectors. The 
adaptive hybrid policy is also the least expensive method of 
establishing cooperation among the three incentive strategies (d–f). 
Once a state of full cooperation has been reached, the adaptive 
hybrid policy, as well as pure punishment, is cheaper as a means of 
maintaining cooperation since it needs to be used only occasionally.  
Widely applicable and  
surprisingly inexpensive 
In the structured population, cooperators 
thrive under a policy of pure rewarding (g), 
forming local mixtures with defectors, but 
ultimately fail to establish a cooperative norm 
for the incentive strength considered. With 
pure punishing (h), an invasion which begins 
with a single cooperator always results in a 
cluster of cooperators that grows and 
eventually displaces all defectors. The adaptive 
hybrid policy (i), on the other hand, exhibits an 
intriguing phase transition. Punishment acts as 
a ‘booster stage’ that capitalizes on and 
amplifies the pro-social effects of rewarding. 
Best of both worlds 
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